Cassational Appeal with respect to the award of the Arbitration Court of Moscow and Award of the Ninth Arbitration Court of Appeals
Federal Arbitration Court
Moscow District
Prosp. Akademika Sakharova 18,
Moscow 107996
Appellant: OAO Severstal
162614 Volgograd District, Cherepovez, Mira st. 30
State Authorities - Recipients of the Contested Act (Cassational Appellant): Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS of Russia)
123995 Moscow, Sadovaya Kudrinskaya st. 11
Third Party: OAO Magnitogorsk Metallurgical (OAO MMK)
455002 Cheliabinsk District, Magnitogorsk, Kirova st. 93
Cassational Appeal
with respect to the award of the Arbitration Court of Moscow as of 27.05.2004 re case #A40-11699/04-2-77 and Award of the Ninth Arbitration Court of Appeals as of 18.08.2004 re case #09AP-324/04-AK
In case #A40-11699/04-2-77 on the motion of OAO Severstal in its decision dated 27.05.2004 (hereinafter, the Decision), the Arbitration Court of Moscow annulled resolution and order of the MAP of Russia as of 14.01.2004 in case #1 06/175-03 on violation of the antimonopoly legislation (hereinafter, Resolution of the MAP of Russia). In its award dated 18.08.2004 in case #09AP-324/04-AK (hereinafter, the Court Award), the Ninth Arbitration Court of Appeals left the Decision of the Court of the First Instance unchanged, and the appeal of the MAP of Russia wasn't allowed.
According to the Federal Antimonopoly Service, the above Decision and Award of the courts are to be reversed for the reasons as follows:
1. Conclusions made by the court of the first instance and the court of appeals are inconsistent with the circumstances of the case and result from wrongful application of the norms of substantive law.
1.1. The courts misinterpret the law, i.e. misunderstand the concept of concerted actions, and thus define them as an agreement, which is wrong.
Agreement and concerted actions as envisaged in Article 6 of the Law of the Russian Federation as of 22.03.91 #948-I «On Competition and Limitation of Monopoly Activity in Commodity Markets» (hereinafter, the Law on Competition) may entail the same implications (restrictive business practice) but they are not identical in terms of performance. The Law on Competition separates these two notions with a word «or» without a comma, which means that agreement and concerted actions are different terms.
Article 6 of the Law on Competition prohibits any contracts, other transactions, agreements (hereinafter, agreement) or concerted actions by economic agents who act in the one-product market (fungible products) that may also result in setting (support) of prices (tariffs), discounts, markups (extra charges), premiums.
Based on Article 6 and equity of the Law on Competition a conclusion can be made that an agreement represents either verbal or written understanding between economic agents with respect to coordination of various aspects of entrepreneurial activities that results (may result) in restriction or elimination of competition in a commodity market or restriction of consumer rights.
Thus, according to Article 6 of the Law on Competition, reaching an agreement envisages verbal and (or) written negotiations between relevant economic agents for the purposes of restriction of competition using methods as listed therein.
The Commission of the MAP of Russia didn't accuse OAO Severstal and OAO MMK of entering into either a verbal or written agreement.
Concerted actions are coordinated and governed actions by economic agents who willfully make their actions dependent on the actions of other market participants that also result in restriction or elimination of competition in a relevant commodity market.
This position is reflected in the decision of the Federal Arbitration Court of the North-West District as of 15.06.2000 #A56-22220/99 (vol.1, 138-141). In particular, the court ruled that to apply the bans introduced by Article 6 of the Law on Competition as a result of concerted actions of economic agents, there's no need to prove that an agreement was made either verbally or in writing. It will suffice to establish deliberately concerted actions aimed at restriction of competition and violation of consumer rights.
The essence of the juridical position of the Commission of the MAP of Russia is that whereas agreement requires negotiations between economic agents, no negotiations are needed to perform concerted actions.
To take a relevant management decision including on changes in prices, it will suffice to have information about such market parameters that are subject to concerted actions. Information about strip material selling prices is publicly available, and strip manufactures don't deny this. For instance, OAO Severstal's prices are published on web-site SSTRADE.RU and prices of OAO MMK are published on MMK.Ru. Broad information regarding the assortment, prices and other metallurgical products parameters in the Russian Federation and international markets is to be found with WORLD STEEL DYNAMICS, information system Rusmet.ru, Chermet Corporation, ZAO Marketing Soyuz, IA Dialton, etc. Besides, the antimonopoly agency receives regular official reports of the Center of Economic Situation by the Government of the Russian Federation (reviews of Russian and international prices of essential goods including ferrous metallurgy).
The essence of concerted actions in the case under review was that initially dominating company OAO Severstal (domination is explained in section 2 hereof) raised its prices to a monopolistically high level, and was followed by outsider company OAO MMK, which in turn raised its prices.
OAO MMK brought its prices close to the prices of dominating company OAO Severstal. Article 6 of the Law on Competition doesn't require such prices to be uniform (the same). To the contrary, second item of paragraph 1 Article 6 of the Law refers to setting (support) of prices (not of the price). The main distinctive feature of such prices is that they can't be raised to such levels in a competitive environment. The introduced prices include a monopolistically high margin (evidence is given in section 2 hereof).
In this case actions are concerted as one economic agent copies actions of other economic agent(s) simultaneously or right after. Such understanding of concerted actions also answers the standards of the Russian language. For instance, this is proven by the literal understanding of the verb «to concert» - to bring in line with, as explained in the Russian-Russian dictionary by S.I. Ozhegov.
OAO MMK would have been unable to increase the prices only by itself because of its small market share (10%), as otherwise it would run a risk of losing its clients (consumers).
Thus, in order to apply the bans introduced in part 1 paragraph 1 Article 6 of the Law on Competition, there is no need to prove in all the cases that there was either a verbal or a written agreement. The Law allows establishing relevant types of concerted actions aimed at limiting competition that would qualify as monopolistic.
Regardless of the above legal provisions, both courts attach the same meaning to «agreement» and «concerted actions», and thereupon declare the regulation of the MAP Commission unjustified as there is no proof of the agreement.
Page 5 of the Court Decision states that:
»The Respondent failed to present any contracts, agreements that would positively prove concerted actions of OAO Severstal, OAO MMK that entailed an increase in strip prices.»
The Arbitration Court of Appeals interprets concerted actions in the same way.
Page 4 of the Court Award states that:
»… according to the reasoning of the antimonopoly authorities, the share of OAO Severstal in the strip material market amounts to about 60%. Neither contested acts nor the comments nor the appeal explain why such a large manufacturer had to concert its actions with the manufacturer (OAO MMK) that has less than 10% of the market in order to influence the market prices».
It is absolutely obvious that there was no need for OAO Severstal to concert its actions with OAO MMK. Due to its dominating position, it is able to engage into monopolistic pricing (which it does) without any coordination with smaller competitors. It was OAO MMK that performed concerted actions as it raised its prices to match the prices of dominating company Severstal. Had OAO Severstal increased the prices alone, its actions would qualify as abuse of dominating position through introducing monopolistically high prices based on item 1 Article 5 of the Law on Competition.
It takes consent of all the parties to enter into an agreement. Unlike an agreement, the pattern of concerted actions is different - a «market leader» (a dominating company) is the first to raise the prices and outsiders then raise their prices to match the prices of such dominating company.
Thus, the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia believes that both courts misinterpreted the notion of concerted actions, which led to improper conclusions.
Pursuant to subparagraph 3 paragraph 2 Article 288 of the Arbitration Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter, the APC of RF), misinterpretation of the law represents misuse of rules of the substantive law and gives grounds to reverse a Award of the arbitration court of the first instance and appeals.
2. Inconsistency between judicial opinion and evidence in the case
It's obvious that not every instance of increase in prices will be ruled illegal and covered by the bans as introduced by Articles 5, 6 of the Law on Competition. To establish the so-called «predatory pricing» (as understood in the international antimonopoly practice), i.e. prices that include а monopolistically high margin (monopoly rent), it is necessary to perform a structural analysis of prices over time. Subject to the analysis are (in absolute amounts and growth rates): prices, cost of production, profit and breakeven level. Breakeven level is usually measured as a ratio of profit and costs or profit and price of goods.
If prices grow in line with production and circulation costs, in a highly concentrated market this will be a sign of unjustified prices increase and illegal component in the price, i.e. monopolistic surplus profit.
During analysis of the Russian strip market, the MAP Commission found that:
· Russian strip market is highly concentrated: the dominating supplier is OAO Severstal (60, 3%) and there are several smaller suppliers (outsiders) including OAO MMK (10%), OAO NOSTA (15, 8%); remaining share is imported. This market type is called monopolistic competition. Highly concentrated markets always create prerequisites for anticompetitive (monopolistic) activities.
· Due to remoteness of most importers (Germany, Japan, etc.) and high circulation costs, the Russian strip market is relatively closed, i.e. at the time of the analysis prices of most importers would render their products non-competitive in the Russian market.
Even main strip importer to the Russian Federation - OAO Khartsizsky Metallurgical (Ukraine) is unable to materially increase its strip supplies to the Russian Federation as the Ukrainian Government controls utilization of production capacity for production of oil and gas pipes of large diameter primarily in its own territory, i.e. industrial policy of the Ukrainian Government aims above all to promote and support interests of the domestic producers of value-added and downstream products. Another proof that the market is rather closed is that regardless of high strip prices in Russia that still keep growing no new important players have emerged in the market.
· Cost of strip material production of Russian manufactures is lower than that of most importers due to lower expenditures (price of raw materials, power, payroll, etc.) Coupled with lower circulation costs of Russian manufacturers this results in very high barriers for entering the Russian strip market;
· OAO Severstal dominates in the strip market and has a 60, 3% share. This fact was established by the Arbitration Court of Appeals (paragraph 5 page 4 of the Award).
Pursuant to Article 4 of the Law on Competition, dominating position is an exclusive situation of an economic agent or several economic agents in a commodity market that has no substitution or fungibles (hereinafter, certain product) that enables it (them) to exercise decisive influence on general conditions of commodity circulation in the relevant market or complicate market access for other economic agents.
· Strip (for production of oil and gas pipes) is a homogenous standardized commodity and its qualitative properties are strictly specified. In such conditions, major conditions of commodity circulation subject to the producer's influence are the output and prices. The fact that OAO Severstal is able to set and support prices (which it does) that are significantly higher that the cost of production, which would be impossible in conditions of the competitive market (see definition of the competition in Article 4 of the Law on Competition), proves that it holds a dominating position in the strip market according to the definition of a dominating position as given in Article 4 of the Law on Competition.
· In its analysis, the MAP Commission has also found that two strip producing companies under investigation didn't operate at a loss, i.e. generated profit. Moreover, production profitability was higher than that of manufacturers in other countries, which wasn't denied by the companies subject to examination.
· Regardless of this fact, OAO Severstal followed by OAO MMK continued to increase the prices, whereas the prices grew much faster than costs. The economic analysis by the MAP of Russia of the data presented by OAO Severstal and OAO MMK established that cost of metal in the period under review increased on average by about 13 - 16%. According to the data of OAO Severstal and OAO MMK, from July 2002 till March 2003 cost of strip increased by 13% and 23%, correspondingly. In the meantime, selling price of strip for oil and gas pipes of a large diameter increased by 32% and 53%, whereas strip prices grew almost simultaneously, and the difference didn't exceed 7%.
The above data provided complete evidence of untenable increase in prices due to high concentration of the market power in the strip market and abuse of such power.
Monopolistically high prices shall be established according to the definition of a monopolistically high price as stated in Article 4 of the Law on Competition:
«a monopolistically high price is a commodity price set by an economic agent that holds a dominating position in the market and which will enable the economic agent to compensate for untenable costs and (or) get a profit that will be significantly higher than in comparable conditions or in case of competition» (as stated in Federal Law of 09.10.2002 #122-FZ).
For instance, the market of hot-rolled products is compatible (in terms of costs) to the market of strip material for oil and gas pipes. Over 10 major metallurgical plants in Russia manufacture hot-rolled products. On average, competition is much more developed in other markets of hot-rolled products than in the market of strip for oil and gas pipes of a large diameter. Correspondingly, breakeven level in the market of hot-rolled products is much lower than in the market of strip material for oil and gas pipes.
Thus, conclusions made by the MAP Commission were confirmed by the economic analysis of structure and movement of prices. Study of gathered evidence established the following: dominating company OAO Severstal increased the prices to the level much higher than in competitive environment, which was followed by the increase in prices by outsider OAO MMK, i.e. the prices of the second company were brought in conformity with those of the first one. The latter represented the essence of concerted actions (the second company followed the first one in its pricing policy).
Courts of the first instance and appeals didn't assess the quantitative analysis and qualitative conclusions on movement and structure of strip prices as given by the MAP Commission.
According to the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia, the essence of a judicial error is that evidence presented by antimonopoly authorities was not regarded as justification of inadmissible anticompetitive price increase, but as facts that can't substantiate concerted actions, which in turn the courts liken to an agreement.
Thus, Page 5 of the Court Decision says:
In the opinion of the court, the documents shall not be deemed a basis to prove violation by OAO Severstal, OAO MMK of part 1 Article 6 of the Law on Competition, as taken together they represent an expert opinion.
Statistical data on hot-rolled products manufactured at Russian metallurgical plants, financial statements of OAO Vyksunsky Metallurgical, RAO Gazprom, OAO AK Transneft, information about changes in cost of strip production don't prove concerted actions by OAO Severstal, OAO MMK aimed at illegal increase in prices.
Concerted actions to increase prices must be aimed at elimination, limitation, prevention of competition, which in this case hasn't been proven by the MAP of Russia either. Most evidence as presented to the MAP of Russia covers increase in prices of oil and gas strip material of OAO Severstal and OAO MMK.
Page 3 of the Court Award states:
The case files contain no proves of coordinated activities of OAO Severstal and OAO MMK.
The dynamics chart of selling prices for strip of OAO MMK, OAO Severstal and OAO NOSTA (76) bear witness of the fact that the growth in prices during certain periods (July, September 2002 and January 2003) could be observed in each of the three producers.
In November 2002 prices of the OAO Severstal were still while there was a significant rise in the selling prices of OAO MMK. In February 2003 the OAO Severstal prices were decreasing, when the OAO MMK prices rose sharply. Moreover, identical price level was reached only once, in March 2003, despite the fact that the study covered a period of 8 months, which proves absence of any coordinated actions.
Worth mentioning is that the Competition Law, Art. 6, p.1 does not cover the establishment of a unified price, though prohibits setting (support) of prices. Submissions of the court about the absence of «identical price» in motivating its case are not statutory.
It is also improper, as noted above, to classify monopoly behavior or absence thereof based only on increase in prices. A structured analysis of prices is mandatory to come to ponderable conclusions (on presence or absence of dominant position abuse). However, the courts neither analyzed, nor gave substantial evaluation of the statistics adduced by the FAS of Russia.
Such erroneous system of argument and ignoring of significant facts led judges to conclusions inconsistent with the evidence in the case.
According to the Administrative Code of RF Art. 288, p.1, the inconsistence of the conclusions in the decision, decree of the court, with the evidence in the case, gives grounds to vacate the court decision, decision of the arbitration court of the first and of the appeal instances.
3. Misinterpretation of the law as regards pricing by the economic agent
Courts of both instances misinterpreted provisions of the Law on Competition, subject to application as regards the permitted procedures of setting prices, which led them to improper conclusions.
Thus, on pp. 5-6 the Decision of the court states:
»The aforementioned condition (price increase - note by FAS of Russia) is not challenged by the parties, though the fact of price increase as such is not a violation of the provisions of the Federal Law «On competition and limitation of monopoly activity in commodity markets» and naturally does not prove that such increase was concerted».
The court statement that «the fact of increase per se is not a violation of the provisions of the Competition Law» is in disaccord with Art.5 and Art.6 of the Competition Law, which prohibits the increase of prices to a monopolistically high level by solely dominating economic agent (Art.5, p.1) or by several economic agents (Art.6, p.1). If the fact of price increase is assessed quantitatively and qualitatively in due order (setting of monopolistically high price or prices is proven), then such a fact witnesses indisputably a violation of the Competition Law, which the FAS of Russia proved in particular in this case.
Similar objection the FAS of Russia regarding the arbitration court of the appeal instance statement (p.3 of the Court Award):
«Since strip prices are not subject to regulation by the state, it is improper to make conclusions on their economic untenability based on prime cost.»
It should be noted that the premise and the conclusion in the aforementioned statement lack congruity with one another (one is not conducive to the other) at least while the order of ascribing of costs to the prime cost is regulated by the tax legislation of the Russian Federation.
Furthermore the mentioned provisions of the Competition Law (Art.5 and Art.6) state directly that even in the absence of state regulation of prices, fixing of monopoly (anti-competition) prices is unlawful. Price cannot be proven monopoly high unless an analysis of the price level as well as of the volume and ratio of prime cost and profit is conducted. That is due directly to the definition of a monopolistically high price provided by the Competition Law, Art.4.
Therefore in the mentioned assertions of the court of the first and of the appeal instances there is misinterpretation, which according to subpara.3, para.1 Art.288 of the Administrative Procedure Code gives grounds to the vacating of court decision, Award of an arbitration court of the first and the appeal instances.
4. Misinterpretation of the law as regards demand of the courts to present evidence of restrictive business practice
As follows from the Decision of the court of the first instance and Award of the arbitration court of appeals, some additional facts are required to prove restrictive business practice. This is confirmed by the provisions of the judicial acts given below.
Page 5 of the Court decision:
Concerted actions to increase prices must be aimed at the elimination, limitation and exclusion of competition, which in the given case also remains unsubstantiated by the MAP of the Russian Federation.
Page 4 of the Court Award:
»The court came to the conclusion that the FAS of Russia did not prove either the existence of the concerted actions or that the competition in the corresponding market was restricted as a result of the rise in prices in the period from July 2002 until March 2003.»
Page 3 of the Court Award:
»The Court did rightfully also determine that there was no evidence submitted as to the fact that the price growth had resulted in the restriction of competition in the market.
Due to the fact that the OAO «Severstal» and OAO «MMK» had higher selling prices within the period from December 2002 until March 2003 more favorable conditions were created for other market participants such as OAO NOSTA and foreign producers for promoting their products».
The reason for such statements by the court is, in the view of the FAS of Russia, the misinterpretation of the Competition Law.
According to Art.4 of the Competition Law monopolistic activity is acts (omissions) of economic agents aimed at exclusion, limitation or elimination of competition (Federal Law of 09.10.2002 № 122-FZ).
List of particular types of monopolistic activity, i.e. activity in the form of exclusion, limitation or elimination of competition is provided in part II of the Competition Law (»Monopolistic activity»), Articles 5 and 6 included. One of the monopolistic activity types is the fixing of monopolistically high prices by one or several economic agents. According to the Competition Law if the fact of fixing of such prices is proven, such activities are qualified as monopolistic activity, i.e. activity that limits competition, and it is not required to prove restrictive business practice with any other facts.
Therefore, the misinterpretation by judges of the notion of monopolistic activity provided by the Competition Law led to incorrect conclusions on unproved restrictive business practice. According to subparagraph 3 paragraph 1 Art. 288 of the APC of Russia, this gives a basis to vacate the decision and award of the Arbitration Courts of First Instance and Appeals.
5. Other Circumstances of the Case Misinterpreted by the Courts
5.1. In paragraphs 2, 3 on page 6 of the Decision, the Court concludes that since OAO Severstal and OAO MMK are not mentioned in the Register of Economic Agents that have more than a 35% share in a given commodity market (hereinafter, the Register), then, correspondingly, opinion of the MAP of Russia that the cumulative share of OAO Severstal and OAO MMK in the strip market is 70.3% is unproved.
If an economic agent is not to be found in the Register, it isn't a decisive confirmation of the fact that it doesn't have a market share of over 35%.
The Register is for information and accounting purposes, it is constantly updated depending on the market situation, and according to the Information Letter #32 of the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated 30.03.98 it is not a necessary condition to recognize an economic agent a dominating market participant (paragraph 8 of the letter of the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation).
Cumulative share of OAO Severstal and OAO MMK in the strip market of 70.3% was identified during examination of violation of antimonopoly legislation in compliance with the authorities granted to the antimonopoly authorities with paragraph 8 Article 12 of the Law on Competition, which is confirmed by the Market Competition Analysis (vol.1,69-80), as well as the data presented buy OAO MMK (vol. 2, 89-90) during examination of violation of antimonopoly legislation by the MAP Commission. This analysis was performed in compliance with the Procedures for analysis and assessment of competitive environment in commodity markets as approved by the order of the MAP of Russia dated 20.12.96 #169.
Thus, the opinion of the court regarding the unproved share of more than 35%, as such economic agents are not to be found in the Register, is inconsistent with the circumstances of the case and resulted from ignoring existing evidence (statistical data).
5.2. Pages 3-4 of the Court Award to justify absence of competition restrictions say:
«According to the «Volume of Supplies» (75, vol.1), there was an increase in strip supplies of all manufactures, especially OAO NOSTA, in the period from July 2002 till October 2003».
«Antimonopoly authorities didn't investigate cumulative demand for strip of the Russian pipe producers; limited pipe production due to higher strip price wasn't proven».
In this case, the court used misinterpretation of the circumstances of the case. Higher volume of supplies by OAO NOSTA (upon completion of bankruptcy procedure) resulted from a drastic increase in prices by OAO Severstal and OAO MMK - by more than 30%. Supplies of OAO Severstal and OAO MMK also increased, but to a lesser degree. This is due to the fact that strip demand is price-inelastic, i.e. pipe producers will have to buy strip even if prices change drastically, as oil and gas pipelines must be maintained on a permanent basis, and it is not possible to use other (substitute) goods as no such products are available in the market of pipes of required diameter and market of strip for pipe production. Neither it is possible to abandon pipe production, as oil and gas are strategic products.
Thus, courts make a wrong judgment that production increase (primarily, in terms of value) proves that competition wasn't subject to restriction. In this case, competition was restricted not through reduced output (see second paragraph on page 4 of the referred Court Award, but by waiving price competition in favor of monopolistic pricing, i.e. rejection of price competition of economic agents that can reasonably detain price growth (see definition of competition in Article 4 of the Law on Competition). Such actions are prohibited by item 1 Article 6 of the Law on Competition.
According to FAS of Russia, this judicial error was made because of misunderstanding of economic peculiarities of this market and wrong substitution of notions by the court (instead of limitation of competition by means of setting and supporting prices as imputed by FAS to two economic agents, the court ignored the circumstances of the case and discussed output restriction, although this is a different form of restrictive business practice not discussed at the commission of antimonopoly authorities).
5.3. Page 4 (paragraph 2) of the Court Award says that «the possibility to purchase same goods from foreign manufacturers wasn't considered». This doesn't correspond to the actual circumstances of the case.
The MAP of Russia considered possible strip supplies by foreign manufacturers, also in the Analysis of Competition in the Strip Market. Such possibilities (economically viable) have never existed, which is also proven by the fact that regardless of a significant increase in domestic strip prices and absence of strip import customs tariffs, the situation of other major market participants hasn't changed materially, the market is still rather closed and highly concentrated.
6. The conclusion made by the court of the first instance that the Regulation and Instructions of the MAP of Russia are inconsistent with Articles 1, 4, 6 of the Law on Competition and violate the rights and interests of OAO Severstal and OAO MMK, is inconsistent with the circumstances of the case and is based on misinterpretation of Article 6 of the Law on Competition and violates the substantive law.
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter, the Civil Code of the RF), civil rights (including for entrepreneurial activities) may be limited based on the federal law. This limitation of rights was introduced by Article 6 of the Law on Competition.
Moreover, lawfully introduced acts of the Commission of the MAP of Russia can't be recognized as violating the rights of the Appellant or interfering with his entrepreneurial activities, as his activities are illegal pursuant to paragraph 2 Article 34 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Part 2, paragraph 1 Article 10 of the Civil Code of the RF that prohibit economic activities aimed at monopolization, use of civil rights to restrict competition, as well as abuse of dominating position in the market.
Based on the aforesaid, pursuant to Articles 10, 13 of the Civil Code of the RF, Articles 4, 6,11,12,27 of the Law on Competition and pursuant to articles 277,287,288 of the Arbitration Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, the Federal Antimonopoly Service
hereby asks
the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District to recall in full the Decision of the Arbitration Court of Moscow dated 27.05.2004 in case #A40-11699/04-2-77 and the Award of the Ninth Arbitration Court of Appeals dated 18.08.2004 in case #09AP-324/04-AK and forward the case to the Arbitration Court of Moscow.
Appendices
1. Decision of the Arbitration Court of Moscow dated 27.05.2004 in case #A40-11699/04-2-77.
2. Award of the Ninth Arbitration Court of Appeals dated 18.08.2004 in case #09AP-324/04-AK.
3. Evidence of dispatch of a cassational appeal to the parties to the case.
4. Copy of the power of attorney of the representative.
Attorney in Fact
Deputy Head of Legal Department
of the Federal Antimonopoly Service O.G. Mishakov