

The Russian Federation
Roundtable on «Ex-officio cartel investigations of
and the use of screens to detect cartels»
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The OECD Competition Committee

Introduction

In recent years the struggle against cartels is one of priority directions of the FAS Russia's activity. During 2007-2013 considerable steps aimed at strengthening of combating cartels were taken in Russia.

Necessary changes were added to the legislation (the Law on Protection of Competition, the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the Code on Administrative Violations of the Russian Federation). With these changes introduced, a definition "cartel" was harmonized with the international law, a direct administrative liability in the form of turn-over fines for conclusion of anticompetitive agreements was introduced, a special unit on combating cartels was formed in the FAS Russia, cooperation with law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation was established.

1. Pro-active and reactive measures of detection of cartels in Russia

1.1. Current system of detection of cartels

The system of detection of cartels in Russia is a set of elements of legal, organizational and methodical characters.

Legal support

Nowadays a legislative base and a normative-legal base on combating cartels include more than 20 documents.

Key documents in the field of cartel detection are the Federal law of July 26, 2006 No. 135-FZ "On Protection of Competition" (further – the Law on Protection of Competition), the Code on Administrative Violations of the Russian Federation and the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation that provide for application of measures of administrative and criminal liabilities for cartel activity.

Organizational support

In August 2008, a special unit - the AntiCartel Department was formed in the Central Office of the FAS Russia. Key objectives of the Department have been implementation of enforcement activity on detection and suppression of cartels (other

forms of collusions and coordination of economic activity), interaction with the law enforcement agencies and the supervising bodies within implementation of the activity specified, organizational and methodical support of antimonopoly authorities' activity on detection and suppression of cartels, participation in improvement of normative-legal base in the sphere of combating cartels, as well as creation among economic entities and in the society of atmosphere of intolerance to cartels and inevitability of strict punishment (up to imprisonment) for participation in them.

Staff of regional offices of the FAS Russia are also involved in combating cartels.

Methodological support

The methodological support system on combating cartels in Russia includes information-reference publications, presentation materials, books, scientific articles as well as training movies (in total more than 30 items) made on the basis of the practical experience of the FAS Russia's staff.

Important stages of the methodological support of activity in the field of combating cartels are gathering, generalization and distribution of national experience.

At present the system on effective combating cartels is created in Russia. The system includes the following:

- carrying out the "Best Cartel Case" competitions (such competitions took place in the FAS Russia in 2009-2011);
- edition of publications "Combating Cartels" containing descriptions of antimonopoly cases, antimonopoly authorities' case decisions, instructions issued to defendants, rulings of antimonopoly and judicial authorities;
- regular conference calls on topical issues on combating cartels.

Tools on detection and proof of cartels

In view of special complexity of detection and proof of cartels the FAS Russia pays particular attention to improving forms and methods of its activity in this direction.

An important stage of work on detection and proof of cartels is obtaining information on possible anticompetitive agreements which sources can be:

- confidential information from representatives of economic entities sustaining losses because of anticompetitive actions of other economic entities;
- information from law enforcement agencies;
- information of mass media;
- official statement to the antimonopoly authority about the facts of violation of the antimonopoly law;
- explanations of representatives of economic entities;
- information received during inspections of economic entities ("dawn raids");

- information received as answer to an inquiry;
- giving oneself up with a confession of being guilty.

One of the most effective ways to obtain information and proofs of existence of cartel agreements is gathering such information and proofs during unscheduled inspections with use of procedures of check-up of rooms and documents of the person under checking (in foreign practice, "dawn raids").

Since the Russian legislation has got norms allowing the antimonopoly authority to carry out unscheduled inspections, the FAS Russia has actively used tools of such inspections in its practical activities. In 2009-2012, the FAS Russia made more than 150 dawn raids of economic entities.

An important element of tools for obtaining information on existence of cartels, as well as on their proof, is exemption from liability for participation in the cartel provided for by Article 14.32 of the Russian Code on Administrative Violations. (so-called "leniency program").

During 2010 - 2011 the right to apply for a leniency program were exercised by more than 40 economic entities, whose statements served as a basis for decisions on violation of the antimonopoly law by antimonopoly authorities.

It should be noted that on the main page of the official site of the FAS Russia the information on a procedure to apply for a leniency program (<http://fas.gov.ru/about/structure/cartel/>) e-mail and phone number to communicate with persons authorized to take such applications is published. The circle of these persons is restricted. When taking such applications the FAS Russia in accordance with the current legislation of the Russian Federation provides confidentiality of received information.

Also in the Russian anticartel practice electronic proofs, including data from computers of checked persons, video, photos, audio recordings, data of operators of electronic trading floors, communications operators, TV- and radio companies, is extensively applied.

For increase in productivity of gathering and the analysis of electronic proofs the FAS Russia along with the Expert and Criminalist Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia has created a special equipment – the "Search" system that allows carrying out copying of information from various electronic devices, with its subsequent decoding and recovering of deleted files.

Nowadays the "Search" system is actively used in inspections carried out by the FAS Russia.

Practical interaction with the law enforcement agencies

In 2004, for the purpose of increase in activity effectiveness on prevention and suppression of violations of the antimonopoly law the provision "On a Procedure of Cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia and FAS Russia" was adopted. The Procedure provides for exchange of information between authorities,

rendering practical assistance to employees of the FAS Russia when carrying out inspections, an order of making by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs of decisions on initiation of criminal cases upon materials represented by FAS Russia etc.

Interaction between the FAS Russia and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia has kept developing. So, in 2012 the following took place:

- permanent operative-investigating group of representatives of the FAS Russia and Police was created;

- unscheduled inspections made by FAS Russia in interaction with representatives of law enforcement agencies took place. Specialists of antimonopoly authorities took part in tens of investigative actions (searches, interrogations) carried out by law enforcement agencies.

- together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia the basic methodical materials on an order of reveal and documenting of crimes connected with violations of the antimonopoly law. These materials are recommended for use in practical activities of divisions for economic safety of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia;

- draft federal laws on adding changes to the legislation on operative-research activity, Criminal and Criminally - Procedural Codes, etc. were developed.

1.2. Formation of optimum system of detection of cartels

The optimum system of detection of cartels in each country can have the its own distinctive features. At the same time the system of detection of cartels has to include obligatory elements without which it won't be able to function. First of all, it is a question of availability of an appropriate legislative base and a normative and legal base defining a necessary scale of powers by the antimonopoly authority as well as the necessary up-to-date tools for detection of information and proofs that are necessary for disclosure of a cartel.

Thus, it is necessary to understand that a fault of any element of this system can reflect negatively the system in whole, and even make its functioning impossible.

In modern conditions when one can see a technical progress and growth in "refinement" of violators of the antimonopoly law, it is particular important to keep in mind the necessity to improve elements of the cartel detection system in order to have the system function effectively.

It is also necessary to pay attention to an aspect of proof of existence of cartel.

When proving a cartel the antimonopoly authorities deal with two categories of evidences:

- direct evidence indicates directly facts of violation that are documents (contracts, agreements, minutes, statements, letters, etc.) as well as testimonial evidence;
- indirect evidence indicates the collateral facts that have cause-and-effect relations or other relation with facts of violation (the analysis of behavior of economic entities, the market analysis, mathematical examination).

How to get direct evidence?

As it was mentioned above, the most effective way to obtain direct evidence for cartel cases is to conduct an unscheduled inspection.

Direct evidence can be obtained by means of realization of the following powers of the antimonopoly bodies:

- inspection;
- obtaining of explanations;
- request for documents (information);
- a voluntary application on violation to the federal body from a person (a group of persons) under the Note to leniency program.

It is worth noting that in recent years a tendency to transformation of forms of evidence on existence of cartels from written evidence having signatures and seals to encrypted electronic documents.

«Evolution» of form of evidence of cartel existence

<i>Before 2007</i>	<i>2007-2009</i>	<i>2010-2013</i>
1. The content of a document was clear (setting up a cartel); 2. The name of an economic entity was clear; 3. The document was signed (sealed).	1. The content of a document was clear (setting up a cartel); 2. The name of an economic entity was clear; 3. The document was not signed (sealed).	1. The content of a document was encrypted; 2. The name of an economic entity was encrypted; 3. The document was not signed.

How to get indirect evidence?

The main way to obtain indirect evidence is an economic analysis that includes analysis of behavior of economic entities and market analysis.

The economic analysis is aimed at proving synchronism and uniformity of actions of economic entities in absence of objective economic reasons, and (or) activity of economic entities is directed against their own interests, and (or) actions of economic

entities couldn't take place under any other conditions, except as on condition of existence of collusion among them (proof by contradiction).

Regarding the system of detection of cartels in a context of application of pro-active and reactive measures, it should be noted that app. 80% of cartel cases detected in Russia were revealed by application of pro-active measures. It is impossible to answer unambiguously whether it is good or bad. Russia is the country with a rather "young" system of the antimonopoly regulation of the age of barely more than 20 years. During this period the country leaders and, of course, the antimonopoly authorities have come to accept the danger of cartels and need to form an effective system on cartel disclosure. As a whole, it is possible to say that this task is solved rather successfully.

However, awareness of gravity of violations made and understanding of possible consequences (including, use of measures of criminal liability) by Russian economic entities haven't reached that level which is observed in the countries with more "mature" system of antimonopoly regulation in which violators most actively use the leniency program.

At the same time, "demonstration" of ability of the antimonopoly authority to detect cartels due to pro-active measures, in turn, can be incentive for economic entities to apply for the leniency program.

Picking up a question regarding costs, both financial and the human, connected with cartels disclosure, it is possible to believe that in application of pro-active measures such costs will be less. Though there wasn't special researches on this question in Russia conducted.

Examples of cases won due to use of pro-active measures

Chemical cartels

The cartels revealed by FAS Russia in the chemical industry during 2010 - 2012 can be considered as professional achievements of the antimonopoly authorities. As a result of this work the whole layer of the worst violations of the antimonopoly law, was opened and shown to society. It is not exaggeration to say that consequence of these violations negatively affected all citizens of the Russian Federation. Examples of cartel cases in the chemical industry shows scales of spread of this dangerous phenomenon in the Russian economy.

1.1. The first case in a series of "chemical cartels" is the case of violation of the antimonopoly law under a code name "CHLORINE".

An investigation started in spring 2010 within an unscheduled inspection on observance of the antimonopoly legislation by the "Kaustik, JSC" (Volgograd city). The

inspection showed participation of the company in a price collusion and collusion on a chlorine market sharing.

In total more than 10 unscheduled inspections in Moscow, the Moscow Region, Nizhny Novgorod, Volgograd, Kemerovo, Novocheboksarsk (Republic of Chuvashia) were conducted. In these inspections along with specialists of FAS Russia the law enforcement officers took part as well.

During inspections tens of documents and electronic files confirming existence of the cartel were received.

As it was established during consideration of the case, in 2007 all main producers of chlorine: Kaustik, JSC (Volgograd), Khimprom, JSC (Novocheboksarsk), Khimprom, JSC (Volgograd), Hloraktiv, CJSC, Bekborn, LTD, a group of persons including Sibur, LTD, SIBUR Holding, CJSC and Sibur Neftekhim JSC, a group of persons including TD Khimprom, LTD, PO Khimprom, LTD, concluded the agreement on price fixing and sharing of the commodity market of chlorine by sales volume and structure of buyers.

The cartel operated within the territory of the whole country for quite a long time, 3 years and 6 months.

Researches of the market showed that during existence of the cartel the prices on liquid chlorine in containers grew up from 3 to 5 times.

Actually, all consumers of chlorine suffered from actions of cartel. First of all, the Russian water utilities suffered from the cartel which led to rise in prices of tariffs for drinking water.

During consideration of the case one of participants of the cartel applied for release from liability on the basis of the note to leniency program.

Within the administrative proceedings, the defendants were imposed fines of more than 50 million rubles (1.6 mln. US Dollars).

On the fact of organization of the cartel, the Central Investigation Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in Moscow opened a criminal case on the grounds of violation of paragraphs "a" and "b" of Part 2 of Article 178 of the RF Criminal Code.

1.2. Within the investigation of the cartel on the chlorine market some materials of existence of a cartel in the cable elastons market were received.

In particular, within the inspection of the Bekborn, LTD, a report of "Group First Chemical Company, CJSC" on sales of cable elastons by Russian producers in 2004 - 2005 was found out.

According to the report, leaders of "Group PKhK, CJSC", "AK Sibur, JSC", "Caustic, CJSC", "Vladimir Chemical Plant, JSC", "Plastcab, JSC" and their dealers (in particular, Sibur's dealer - "Bekborn, CJSC") reached an agreement on pricing and market sharing by the sales volume of goods and customers. Then "Sayanskhimlast, JSC" joined that agreement.

For example, the agreement established sale quotas of cable elastons for “AK Sibur, JSC” - 3000 tons, “Caustic, CJSC” - 3000 tons, “VKhZ, JSC” - 2000 tons, “Plastcab, JSC” - 500 tons, and “Sayanskhimlast, JSC” - 800 tons.

During consideration of the case on cable elastons from an application for exemption from liability on the basis of the note to leniency program was received from one of participants of the cartel.

The FAS Russia's Commission on the consideration of the case on violation of the antimonopoly legislation found the cartel existence in the market of cable elastons in 2004 – 2005. However, in view of expiration of time limitation (a time limitation on antimonopoly cases are 3 years) had to close that case.

Thus, case papers were sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for making a decision on initiation of legal proceedings concerning officials of abovementioned enterprises as within criminal proceedings the time limitation of 10 years didn't expire.

1.3. One more case from a series of chemical cases is a cartel case on a gepsol (geksol) market.

The substance is applied in the tire and rubber industry.

The interesting feature of the gepsol market is that producers of gepsole in the Russian Federation are only two enterprises: Kaustik, JSC (Volgograd) and Skoropuskovsky Sintez, JSC (Skoropuskovsky Sergiyev - the Posadsky region of the Moscow Region).

Liga, JSC and Skoropuskovsky Sintez, JSC being actually monopolists in the gepsol market, divided the relevant commodity market, coordinated and supported prices in it. For example, competitors's sale prices for gepsol from 2008 to May, 2010 differed no more than for 0,13%.

The FAS Russia's decision on violation of the antitrust law was appealed by defendants in court that acknowledged legality of the FAS's decision. According to the appeal of the specified decision respondents gave up further procedures on appellation, and the FAS Russia's decision came into force.

Case papers were sent to law enforcement bodies for making a decision on initiation of legal proceedings according to Art. 178 of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation.

1.4. The largest cases on chemical cartels initiated by specialists of the FAS Russia were cartels participants of which were producers, their control companies and dealers working in the market of liquid caustic soda and PVC.

1.4.1 . Cartel in the caustic soda market

Liquid caustic soda is widely applied in pulp and paper industry; for saponification of fats in production of soap, shampoo and other detergents; for etching aluminum and in production of pure metals; for production of oils in oil processing.

The cartel on fixing prices and sharing of caustic soda market existed since 2005 and covered the territory of the whole country. Many branches of the Russian economy suffered from the cartel illegal activity because of an essential rise in prices for products.

Besides materials received as a result of numerous unscheduled inspections, the data of the economic analysis were actively used to prove a cartel. To carry out the economic analysis the documents from tens of participants of the market for some years were requested. As a result the amount of case papers exceeded 300 volumes.

During carrying out market analysis, it was established that participants of cartel sent product surplus abroad at lower prices in order to support the high prices for the Russian enterprises.

According to the FAS Russia Commission's decision of 27.12.2011, defendants, among which: "United Trade Company", "Sibmanagment", "Khimprom" (Volgograd city), "NPO Reagenti", "Sayanskhimpast", "Siberian Chemical Company", "Ilimkhimprom"; a group of persons of "Sibur", "Sibur Holding", "Sibur Neftekhim"; a group of persons of Mineral and Chemical Company "Eurokhim, "Novomoskovsk Azot JSK, "Novomoskovsky Chlor"; a group of persons of "Bashkirskaya Khimiya", "Kaustic" (Sterlitamak); group of persons of "Renova Orgsintez", "Khimprom" (Novocheboksarsk); a group of persons of "Nikokhim", "Kaustic" (Volgograd); a group of persons of "HaloPolymer", "HaloPolymer Kirovo-Chepetsk"; a group of persons of "Khimprom Trade House (Kemerovo city), PO "Khimprom" (Kemerovo city) were found guilty of a violation of the antitrust law by means of creation of a cartel on price fixing and sharing of the caustic soda commodity market.

Upon the fact of the cartel organization, the Head Investigative Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in Moscow brought a criminal case on signs of violation of paragraphs "a" and "b" points of Part 2 of Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

Defendants were imposed fines at the sum of more than 1,6 billion rubles.

Some materials containing signs of violation of the tax legislation were sent to the Federal Tax Service of Russia. As a result of carrying out additional tax inspections, the participants of the cartel were additionally imposed taxes on the sum over than 1,4 billion rubles.

After the FAS Russia's was made the cartel actually stopped its existence. The FAS Russia's decision was supported by courts of two instances.

1.4.2. Cartel in PVC market

One of products of the chemical industry without which it is difficult to imagine the modern life is polyvinylchloride (PVC) which is used for production of window profiles and frames, pipes, other construction materials, medical products, imitation leather, film materials etc.

As it was found by the FAS Russia, some enterprises being participants of a cartel in the caustic soda market (Kaustik, JSC (Volgograd), Kaustik, CJSC (Sterlitamak), Sayanskkhimplast, JSC) under leadership of the United Trade Company, JSC created also a cartel on sharing a PVC market.

The cartel operated on for not less than 5 years. It was revealed during studying of the materials received within unscheduled inspections. The main proofs of existence of the cartel were an agreement concluded by its participants, their correspondence and conclusions of the economic analysis carried out by FAS Russia.

The participants of the cartel are being faced fines in total several bln. rubles. Case papers were sent to the law enforcement bodies for making a decision on initiation of criminal case under Art. 178 of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation.

Pollock cartel

An antimonopoly investigation in the market of production and wholesale of pollock and products of its processing was started upon a request of the Government of the Russian Federation simultaneously with an investigation of a violation of the law on strategic investments.

It was found that an annual increase in quotas provided for a pollock catch for 2007-2009 the volume of deliveries to the Russian market didn't lead to increase and made only 60-70 thousands of tons, and increase in quotas led only to increase in export. Needs of the Russian consumers for pollock and products of its processing weren't provided in corpora in 2007-2009 that resulted in deficiency of these goods.

It is confirmed by the fact that during 2006-2010 the pollock and products of its processing were imported to the territory of the Russian Federation (generally from China that doesn't catch this sort of fish).

It was possible also because of the fact that in April, 2006 a number of the economic entities which operated in the market of production and wholesale of pollock and products of its processing within the territory of the Russian Federation, formed a cartel aimed at establishing and fixing prices for pollock and products of its processing, as well as regulation of production of pollock products and volumes of its sale in the Russian market.

Coordination of activity of the Pollock Cartel was carried out "under a sign" of an official structure – the Associations of Pollock Fishermen.

Besides a formal membership in the Association, participants of cartel were united by joining to anti-competitive decisions and agreements made at Association's meetings on prices, volumes, terms of deliveries of pollock and products of its processing in the

market, a procedure of their sale for separate time periods or by separate types of production.

The limited offer of these goods in the Russian market took place in connection with the tough export-oriented policy which was carried out by participants of Pollock cartel.

The main proofs on the case were the materials received during joint with the law enforcement authorities of unscheduled inspections (minutes of meetings of the Association, correspondence among its members and their agreements on volumes of catch of pollock and products of pollock processing).

Consideration of the case and decisions of the Governmental Commission on Control of Foreign Investments led to disintegration of the cartel and the largest redivision of the Russian market of production of bioresources.

Case papers were sent to the law enforcement authorities, the RF Tax Service and the RF Customs Service.

1.3. Policy in the field of ex-officio investigations of cartels

There is no special policy defining and/or stimulating carrying out ex-officio investigations of cartels in Russia.

Any facts confirming the existence of a cartel, it doesn't matter what a source they are received from, are subject to inspection. An application for a leniency program cannot be considered only if was probably received from an anonymous.

There is no special procedure for carrying out ex-officio investigation of cartels. Procedures of initiation and consideration of cartel cases are regulated by the FAS Russia's "Common Administrative Regulation on Execution of the State Function on Initiation and Consideration of Cases on Violations of the Antimonopoly Law of the Russian Federation" approved by the FAS Russia's bylaw of May 25, 2012 No. 339 (further – Regulation).

At the same time, taking into account that fact that the structure of the Central office of the FAS Russia includes the Anticartel Division, the Regulation contains some features of internal procedures and registration of necessary documents.

3. Screens for officials for detect bid-riggings

In the Russian Federation the majority of public procurements is carried out by open electronic auctions on special electronic floors.

The key document regulating the relations connected with placement of orders for deliveries of goods, performance of work, rendering services for the state, municipal needs, needs of budgetary establishments is the Federal law of July 21, 2005 No. 94-FZ "On placement of orders for deliveries of goods, performance of work, rendering services for the state and municipal needs". Control of the law observance is exercised by Federal Antimonopoly Service.

Moreover, the general principles and basic requirements for carrying out procurements, works and services for public corporations, state-owned enterprises, and subjects of natural monopolies in the Russian Federation are stated in the Federal Law of July 18, 2011 № 223-FZ " On procurement of goods , works, services by certain types of legal entities " (hereinafter - the Law 223- FZ). Monitoring compliance with this law is exercised by the Federal Antimonopoly Service.

The objectives of the Law No.94-FZ and the Law No. 223- FZ are the efficient use of budgetary and off-budgetary resources, development of fair competition, ensuring openness and transparency of placement of orders, preventing corruption and other abuses in placement of orders. Monitoring compliance with these laws is exercised by the Federal Antimonopoly Service.

In addition, the law "On Protection of Competition" establishes antitrust requirements to auctions specifying the prohibition on actions that can lead to prevention, restriction or elimination of competition, including coordination by organizers of the auction of activities of their members, creation of privileged conditions for participants of an auction, violation of the procedure for determination of the winner of the auction etc.

All announcement on public orders should be placed on the single state website that provides maximum openness and on special electronic floors. The state website uses special software that controls the correct entering of the necessary information and data to conduct auctions, for example, it is impossible to use Latin characters instead Russian, as well as it is impossible to enter the information required for participation.

The FAS Russia considers as "red flags" to identify bid-riggings the following:

- refusal of bidders to compete;
- minimum reduction of the initial maximum price of the contract;
- submission of offers for the auction from one IP-address or IP- addresses belonging to the same person;

- "ram" scheme: during the first minutes of an auction two participants reduce the price to such a level that it is economically unprofitable for fair participants of the auction to bargain further (from 25 to 70% from the initial (maximum) price of the contract). Thereafter, the third participant of the agreement, being convinced that other participants of the auction don't show interest to this lot, in the last seconds of the auction offers a price slightly below than the initial (maximum) price of the contract or slightly lower than the last offer of the fair participant.

Subsequently, during consideration of the second parts of the arrived applications it becomes clear that two participants of the agreement who have offered minimum prices, at the end of reception of applications n the demands acceptance termination (before the date an open electronic auction takes place) withdraw necessary documents from private offices or these participants of the agreement refuse to conclude a state contract after they are recognized as winners. Thus, they ensure a victory in auction to the third participant of the agreement that has offered the highest possible price.

The FAS Russia's powers¹ include control and supervision of observance by customers, authorized bodies, specialized organizations, operators of electronic floors, auction committees of the legislation of the Russian Federation and other regulations of the Russian Federation belongs on placement of orders.

Nowadays the FAS Russia's Guidelines on Investigation of Cartels are being developed.

4. FAS Russia's near-term prospective in sphere of combating cartels

One of the main tasks of FAS Russia at the present stage is to provide reliable protection of national economy from cartels and other anticompetitive agreements.

Taking into account this task, a key document in the field of a competition policy - "Strategy of Development of Antimonopoly Regulation in the Russian Federation for 2013-2024" was approved by the Presidium of Board of FAS Russia in February, 2013 that provides for the following measures defining the key directions of improvement of the system of combating cartels in Russia:

- formation in association with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation of a mechanism for effective investigation of agreements (cartels) restricting competition;

- adding changes to the legislation on investigation and search operations regarding a new cause allowing to carry out investigation and search operations upon request of the antimonopoly authority in investigating cartels, as well as inclusion of the antimonopoly authorities as recipients of results of investigation and search operations;

- organization of monitoring for activity of territorial bodies in the field of combating cartels;

- improvement of quality of judicial remedies of FAS Russia's decisions on cartel cases;

- organization of a system of improvement of professional skills on topical problems of combating cartels;

- organizing-and-staff and material-and-technical support of activity of antimonopoly authorities on combating cartels.

¹ The FAS Russia is a federal executive body authorized to exercise control in the sphere of placement of orders for deliveries of goods, performance of work, rendering services for federal state needs, except for control powers in the sphere of placement of orders for deliveries of goods, performance of work, rendering services for state defensive orders, as well as in the sphere of placement of orders for deliveries of goods, performance of work, rendering services for the federal state needs which are not related to the state defensive orders but information of which is a state secret.