Rachik Petrosyan: functionalities of the Informational Analytical System allow to expose overrated prices in drug procurement

07-11-2017 | 15:48

Due to disseminated distorted information about performance of the Informational Analytical System for monitoring and control of medicinal drug procurement (IAS), FAS reports: IAS functionalities already enables to estimate average weighted prices for drug procurement per unit of active substance for a particular International Non-Proprietary Name, thanks to which it is possible to expose overrates prices in the course of drug procurement.

Efficiency of reducing budgetary expenses in procurement, and as a consequence, accuracy of the system work to a great extent depends on unifying information in the State Register of Medicinal Drugs.

“Today we can compare average weighted prices per unit of active substance (for INN) with the price for procurement of a particular drug of a specific trade name and dosage, set by the ordering party in the course of drug procurement, and fix overrated prices for particular procurement with regard to the average weighted price. The problem is that to prove overrated prices and incriminate the ordering party, it is necessary to determine the equivalency of the procured drug. Until the Ministry of Health Care does not refine the State Register of Medicinal Drugs, and equivalency is not determined, unfair ordering parties have legal justification of the highest prices fro procured drug from those entered in the Register”, emphasized Deputy Head of FAS Rachik Petrosyan. “Adopting the necessary regulatory acts by the Ministry of Health Care will enable, first, to exclude overrated initial prices in advance and, second, ensure real competition between equivalent medicinal drugs and reduce prices in the course of bidding”.

 

 



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