Andrey Tsyganov shared the FAS enforcement experience in software algorithms with OECD
Deputy Head of FAS Andrey Tsyganov was a speaker at the Round Table of the Competition Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and development (OECD) in Paris that focused on the algorithms and collusions in enforcement practice of competition authorities
Andrey Tsyganov informed the participants about some practical aspects of antimonopoly enforcement and the associated problems. He highlighted two points:
1) Using algorithms by producers (distributors) to control buyers’ pricing in terms of compliance with the rules for applying the recommended (minimum) prices and possible collusion of producers operating on the same markets
2) Using robots and special software products in bid-rigging, particularly in public procurement.
Andrey Tsyganov pointed out that there are some software products on the market that not only collect and analyze information on the product prices and compare prices with competitor prices, but also control use of particular prices by other market participants. There are also products enabling consistent participation in numerous e-tenders, trace starting prices, the tender progress and the final contract prices in order to ensure that cartel members would win and / or expose participants that do not comply with the cartel rules, as well as imitate tender procedures to avoid invalidating tenders.
Deputy Head of FAS outlined the issue of exposing violations and determining the level of the guilt of various participants involved in developing and using such products and services (particularly, software vendors, managers of the participating companies, end beneficiaries) in order to limit or eliminate competition.
Andrey Tsyganov reminded that in 2016 FAS exposed an automated bid-rigging cartel, when the violators programmed their auction robots for the minimum reduction form the initial price. FAS established that in 25 electronic auctions the cartel participants practically had not reduced the initial contract price, helping each other to win auctions following the strategy determined in advance.